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THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS RULE  
AND THE APPLICABILITY OF U.S. LAW TO 
VISITING FOREIGN SHIPS 
INTRODUCTION 
oreign ships1 have maintained a significant presence in American 
ports and waters since early in the nation’s history.2 This presence 
grew substantially during the last century,3 after many previously 
American vessels reflagged under flags of convenience.4 As a result, the 
vast majority of ships today calling on U.S. ports are foreign-flagged. For 
example, ninety-five percent of the passenger ships and seventy-five per-
cent of the cargo vessels entering American waters are alien.5 These 
numbers underscore the desirability of developing a systematic approach 
for determining when domestic law applies to visiting foreign ships. 
F 
The Supreme Court recently tackled this issue in Spector v. Norwegian 
Cruise Line Ltd.,6 a case addressing whether Title III of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act (ADA)7 applies to foreign-flagged cruise ships in 
American waters. When the Court granted certiorari8 to resolve a pair of 
                                                                                                             
 1. For the purposes of this Note, foreign ships are simply those vessels whose na-
tionality is not American. A vessel’s nationality, generally speaking, is determined by the 
country of her registry and under whose flag she sails. See M/V Saiga (No. 2) (St. Vin-
cent v. Guinea), 38 I.L.M. 1323, 1340 (Int’l Trib. L. of the Sea 1999). 
 2. The impetus behind Congress’s enactment of the first cabotage (coastwise trade) 
laws provides an illustration. Already wary of the influence foreign vessels held over 
international shipping at the beginning of the nineteenth century, Congress passed the 
first of these laws in 1817 to protect domestic maritime interests by limiting intranational 
shipping and the coastwise trade to American vessels. See Act of Mar. 1, 1817, ch. 31,  
§ 4, 3 Stat. 351 (repealed 1933). For an in-depth discussion of American cabotage laws, 
see C. Todd Jones, The Practical Effects on Labor of Repealing American Cabotage 
Laws, 22 TRANSP. L.J. 403, 403–15 (1995). 
 3. See H. Edwin Anderson, The Nationality of Ships and Flags of Convenience: 
Economics, Politics, and Alternatives, 21 TUL. MAR. L.J. 139, 158–61 (1996) (explaining 
that flags of convenience and open registries arose in the 1920s and 1930s as a result of 
efforts by American businessmen looking to lower operational costs). 
 4. A flag of convenience is a flag under which a vessel is registered in order to re-
duce operating costs and avoid the governmental regulations of the state of its beneficial 
ownership. Liberia and Panama are the most familiar flag of convenience states. See Jane 
Marc Wells, Comment, Vessel Registration in Selected Open Registries, 6 MAR. LAW. 
221, 221–27 (1981). 
 5. Austin P. Olney, A Report from the Marine Regulatory Front: Partly Cloudy with 
a Chance of Thunder Storms, 13 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 91, 110 (2000). 
 6. 545 U.S. 119 (2005). 
 7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181–12189 (2006). 
 8. Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 542 U.S. 965 (2004). 
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conflicting rulings from the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits,9 some commen-
tators believed that it would use the opportunity to clearly define when 
and how U.S. law applies to visiting foreign vessels.10 Unfortunately, 
this expectation went unfulfilled as much of the Court’s ruling, a plural-
ity opinion with multiple subparts and voting blocs, has no binding pre-
cedential value.11
Holding that the ADA’s basic requirements do apply to foreign cruise 
ships, a five-Justice majority eschewed as too “broad” the Fifth Circuit’s 
determination that the “clear statement rule”12 prohibits domestic legisla-
tion from applying to foreign vessels absent specific statutory lan-
guage.13 However, a badly fractured Court authored four opinions and 
ultimately failed to agree on precisely how the rule should operate.14 In-
corporating the “internal affairs rule”15 into its reading of the clear state-
ment rule, a four-Justice plurality argued that the rule precluded the ADA 
and other generally applicable statutes16 from applying to the internal 
 
 9. Compare Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 356 F.3d 641 (5th Cir. 2004) 
(holding that Title III does not apply to foreign-flagged cruise ships in American waters), 
with Stevens v. Premier Cruises, Inc., 215 F.3d 1237 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that Title 
III does apply to foreign-flagged cruise ships in American waters). 
 10. See, e.g., Michael A. Orlando, Enforcement of Federal Law on Foreign-Flagged 
Ships in U.S. Waters, INT’L RISK MGMT. INST., Nov. 2004, http://www.irmi.com/Expert/ 
Articles/2004/Orlando11.aspx. 
 11. See generally Adam S. Hochschild, The Modern Problem of Supreme Court Plu-
rality Decision: Interpretation in Historical Perspective, 4 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 261 
(2000) (discussing the ambiguous precedential value of plurality opinions). 
 12. The clear statement rule is a canon of statutory construction employed by Ameri-
can courts to resolve ambiguities in legislative language. In actuality, there is no one clear 
statement rule, but rather an array of such rules, all of which require a clear expression of 
congressional intent within the text of a statute before courts will interpret that statute in a 
way that encroaches on an area of traditional state authority, raises inconsistencies with 
international law, or impinges on intergovernmental immunities, just to name a few. Wil-
liam N. Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules 
as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 598–611 (1992). 
 13. Spector, 545 U.S. at 130. 
 14. Justice Kennedy announced the judgment of the Court and authored an opinion 
joined by Justices Souter and Stevens, and joined in part by Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, 
and Thomas. Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Breyer, wrote an opinion concurring in 
part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Thomas concurred in part, dissented in part, 
and concurred in the judgment in part. Justice Scalia delivered a dissenting opinion, 
which was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor and Thomas in part. 
 15. The internal affairs rule provides that foreign ships are not subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the port state in matters touching only their internal order and discipline unless the 
peace or tranquility of the port state is disturbed. See infra note 36 and accompanying 
text. 
 16. Generally applicable statutes are laws whose legislative language contains words 
of universal application. Typical of most congressional legislation, these laws, if taken at 
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affairs of visiting foreign ships absent a clear expression of congressional 
intent.17 Furthermore, the plurality stated that the rule should be applied 
on a provision-by-provision basis, such that those statutory provisions 
not implicating a ship’s internal affairs would not trigger the rule and 
consequently would apply in full.18 Though the other five Justices did 
not share this vision of the clear statement rule, their disagreement 
amongst themselves ruined any chance that they might provide a major-
ity standard. Thus, instead of definitively defining when U.S. law applies 
to visiting foreign ships, the Court left the question largely unanswered.19
This Note examines the internal affairs rule and its interaction with the 
clear statement rule. Part I explores the jurisdictional issues inherent in 
applying domestic law to visiting foreign vessels and explains that inter-
national law resolves these issues through the internal affairs rule. Fur-
thermore, Part I demonstrates that the United States adheres to the inter-
nal affairs rule, believing it to be a well-established international legal 
principle.20 Part II examines how the Supreme Court has traditionally 
applied the internal affairs rule. Through consideration of the Court’s 
Jones Act21 and National Labor Relations Act22 precedent, this part aims 
to establish that the rule restrains the reach of legislation in some circum-
 
face value, would regulate any and all activities around the world. For example, in 
Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953), Justice Jackson made the following observa-
tion of the Jones Act: 
Unless some relationship . . . to our national interest is implied, Congress has 
extended our law and opened our courts to all alien seafaring men injured any-
where in the world in service of watercraft of every foreign nation -- a hand on 
a Chinese junk, never outside Chinese waters, would not be beyond its literal 
wording. 
Id. at 577. Rather than give effect to the implausible results that follow from such literal 
statutory readings, American courts employ canons of statutory construction to establish 
the law’s proper reach. See id. at 577–79. 
 17. Spector, 545 U.S. at 130. 
 18. Id. at 138–39. 
 19. Commenting on Spector, one observer quipped, “[A]lthough the Court has rear-
ranged the playing field, the rules of the game remain largely undefined.” Philip M. Ber-
kowitz, ADA and Foreign Employers: New Guidance from the Court, N.Y.L.J., July 15, 
2005, at 5. 
20 Generally speaking, American courts recognize international law as constituting a kind 
of federal common law. See, e.g., The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (stating 
that “[i]nternational law is part of our law” and holding that coastal fishing vessels are 
exempt from capture as prize of war under customary international law).  
 21. 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (2006). 
 22. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2006). 
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stances while having no such limiting effect in others.23 Part III returns 
to the Court’s decision in Spector, and discusses the plurality, concur-
ring, and dissenting opinions. Part IV analyzes these opinions in light of 
Parts I and II, and concludes that the plurality provides the proper under-
standing of the clear statement and internal affairs rules. Finally, Part V 
synthesizes the main points of this Note and recapitulates the lesson 
learned from Spector. 
I. JURISDICTIONAL CONFLICT AND THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS RULE 
Any attempt by the United States to prescribe laws applicable to visit-
ing foreign ships presents the risk of conflict between sovereigns.24 This 
conflict emanates from an overlap between two independent principles of 
jurisdiction, territoriality and nationality.25 The United States, as a port 
state,26 derives its authority to prescribe laws applicable to foreign ves-
sels through the jurisdictional principle of territoriality.27 Stemming from 
a nation’s need to control activities within its geographic boundaries, 
territorial jurisdiction allows port states to regulate conduct that occurs or 
has effect within their waters.28 Vessels, on the other hand, are bound by 
the rules and regulations of their flag state through the jurisdictional 
 
 23. It is important to remark here that this Note is only concerned with laws contain-
ing words of universal application. See supra note 16. An express congressional state-
ment that a statute does apply to visiting foreign ships effectively forecloses any question 
as to its applicability. For example, Congress amended the Seamen’s Act of 1915, Act of 
March 4, 1915, ch. 153, 38 Stat. 1164 (codified in part at 46 U.S.C. § 10313 (2006)), in 
1920 to make it applicable to wage disputes between the owners and crewmembers of 
foreign ships docked in American ports. In Strathearn S.S. Co. v. Dillon, 252 U.S. 348 
(1920), the Supreme Court upheld the applicability of the Act to a dispute between a 
British crewman and his British ship master for wages owed under a British employment 
contract for work aboard a British vessel. Given the Act’s express demarcation of its 
reach, the Court explained that any interpretation rendering the Act inapplicable to for-
eign ships and their crew would undermine Congress’s intent “to place American and 
foreign seamen on an equality of right.” Id. at 355. 
 24. Ted L. McDorman, Regional Port State Control Agreements: Some Issues of In-
ternational Law, 5 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 207, 210–11 (2000). 
 25. See id; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 cmt. b 
(1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT] (“Territoriality and nationality are discrete and inde-
pendent bases of jurisdiction; the same conduct or activity may provide a basis for exer-
cise of jurisdiction both by the territorial state and by the state of nationality of the  
actor.”). 
 26. A port state is a state that exercises control over a particular port. See McDorman, 
supra note 24, at 210. 
 27. RESTATEMENT § 402 cmt. h. 
 28. See id. 
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principle of nationality.29 By providing vessels with a comprehensive 
body of laws to govern their shipboard activities, nationality and the law 
of the flag play an essential role in maritime law.30 Ships entering for-
eign ports, therefore, find themselves subject to concurrent port state and 
flag state jurisdiction.31
Though in principle port state jurisdiction is superior to flag state juris-
diction,32 “the legal certainty does not accurately reflect the tension.”33 
Ships have a way of traveling from place to place. Thus if port states at-
tempted to enforce their jurisdiction to the fullest extent upon every visit-
ing vessel, then ships would be forced to navigate through an over-
whelming regulatory patchwork.34 Similarly untenable, if every flag state 
could claim exclusive jurisdiction over its ships at all times, then port 
states would be completely defenseless against harmful vessel activi-
ties.35 Aiming for a reasonable solution to this jurisdictional dilemma, 
the major maritime nations developed the internal affairs rule, which pro-
vides that visiting foreign ships are not subject to port state jurisdiction in 
matters touching only upon the internal order and discipline of the ship 
unless those internal matters disturb the peace and tranquility of the 
port.36
 
 29. See id. §§ 402(2), 502(2). 
 30. David F. Matlin, Note, Re-evaluating the Status of Flags of Convenience Under 
International Law, 23 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1017, 1021–22 (1991). While on the high 
seas, and until it enters another nation’s ports and internal waters, a ship is viewed con-
ceptually as a floating extension of its flag state’s territory. See The Case of the S.S. Lo-
tus (France v. Turkey), 1927 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 10, at 25; The Queen v. Anderson, 
[1868] L.R. 1 C.C.R. 161, 163 (U.K.) (Blackburn, J.) (“[A] ship, which bears a nation’s 
flag, is to be treated as part of the territory of that nation. A ship is a kind of floating  
island.”). 
 31. See RESTATEMENT § 502 cmt. d (“The flag state’s jurisdiction also overlaps in 
some respects with the jurisdiction of the coastal state when the ship is in the territorial 
sea, contiguous zone, or a deepwater port of that state.”). 
 32. See 48 C.J.S. International Law § 23 (2006) (“[T]he jurisdiction of a nation to 
take enforcement action within its territory is absolute.”). 
 33. McDorman, supra note 24, at 211. 
 34. See Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 585 (observing that “there must be some law on ship-
board, [and] that it cannot change at every change of waters”). 
 35. Noting the problems posed by this hypothetical situation, Chief Justice Marshall 
once remarked that “it would be obviously inconvenient and dangerous to society, and 
would subject the laws to continual infraction, and the government to degradation . . . [if 
foreign vessels] were not amenable to the jurisdiction of the country.” The Schooner 
Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 144 (1812). 
 36. R.R. CHURCHILL & A.V. LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 65–66 (3d ed. 1999). 
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A. The Internal Affairs Rule: Two Theories and International Acceptance 
While the finer points of enforcement policy may vary from nation to 
nation, a survey of the legal practices of the international community 
reveals that the internal affairs rule is widely accepted.37 Recently, in Re 
Maritime Union of Australia,38 the High Court of Australia recognized 
the internal affairs rule as a valid tenet of international law, and stated 
that the Australian Industrial Relations Commission should take the rule 
into account in deciding on remand whether certain Australian labor laws 
apply to the crews of foreign vessels.39 Similarly, the Federal Court of 
Canada ruled in Metaxas v. The Galaxias40 that whether severance pay 
was owed to several Greek sailors released from their employment 
aboard a Greek vessel in Vancouver was a question most appropriately 
answered by the law of the flag.41
As regards the internal affairs rule, there are two competing theories to 
which nations subscribe, the French and the English.42 The French theory 
emerged from the consolidated cases of The Sally and The Newton.43 
Both cases involved assaults by one seaman against another occurring on 
board American ships docked in France.44 The Counseil d’Etat45 began 
its analysis by remarking that “the rights of the [flag state] ought to be 
respected touching the internal discipline of the vessel in which the local 
 
 37. See, e.g., PHILIP C. JESSUP, THE LAW OF TERRITORIAL WATERS AND MARITIME 
JURISDICTION 144–91 (1927) (discussing the practices of Belgium, Brazil, Chile, Eng-
land, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Mexico, Norway, Peru, Portugal, Russia, and the 
United States); Sellers v. Maritime Safety Inspector, [1999] 2 N.Z.L.R. 44 (C.A.) (hold-
ing that the Maritime Safety Inspector could not, consistently with international law, 
require a Maltese ship, sailing from a New Zealand port, to carry radio and emergency 
equipment). 
 38. (2003) 214 C.L.R. 397 (Austl.). 
 39. Id. at 419; see also Celtic Marine (Hong Kong) Ltd., (2004) P.R. 947273 (Austl. 
Indus. Relations Comm’n) (acknowledging that the internal affairs rule is a rule of inter-
national law), available at http://www.airc.gov.au/alldocuments/PR947273.htm. 
 40. [1990] 2 F.C. 400 (Trial Div.) (Can.). 
 41. Id; see also Fernandez v. Mercury Bell, [1986] 3 F.C. 454 (C.A.) (Can.) (citing 
“the well-established rule of international law that the law of the flag state ordinarily 
governs the [internal] affairs of a ship”); Rederiet A.P. Moller A/S, [1996] 32 
C.L.R.B.R.2d 136 (Can. Labor Relations Bd.). 
 42. JESSUP, supra note 37, at 145. 
 43. An English translation of this 1806 case is available at A.H. Charteris, The Legal 
Position of Merchantmen in Foreign Ports and National Waters, 1 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 
45, 50–51 (1920). 
 44. Id. at 50. 
 45. The Counseil d’Etat is France’s highest court of administrative justice, settling 
disputes between individuals and the government. Philippe Fouchard, The Judiciary in 
Contemporary Society: France, 25 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 221, 222 (1993). 
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authorities ought not to interfere unless . . . the peace and tranquility of 
the port has been compromised.”46 Then, since in its opinion the assaults 
failed to create a stir outside the ships themselves, the French court held 
that the local tribunals had no jurisdiction to entertain criminal prosecu-
tions against the sailors.47 The French theory thus asserts that port states 
lack jurisdiction over the internal affairs of visiting foreign ships when 
those matters do not disturb the port state’s interests.48
Conversely, the English theory developed from the initial presumption 
that port states possess absolute jurisdiction over visiting foreign ships.49 
This presumption provided the starting point for the court’s analysis in 
The Queen v. Keyn,50 a case involving a German captain arraigned on 
criminal charges for running his vessel into an English ship while pass-
ing through English waters.51 After deducing that any criminal conduct 
that may have occurred would have taken place aboard the German ves-
sel, the court dismissed the indictment and held that the law of the flag 
controlled.52 The court explained its decision, in part, by declaring that 
states may “choose[] to forego the exercise of her law over the foreign 
vessel and crew, or exercise[] it only when they disturb the peace and 
good order of the port.”53 Accordingly, under the English theory, while 
jurisdiction is fully vested in port states as a matter of right, it should not 
be exercised over foreign vessels unless interests beyond those of the 
ship and her crew are involved.54
The French and English theories differ, therefore, only on the question 
of whether port state jurisdiction over the internal affairs of foreign ves-
sels is yielded as a matter of right or discretion. Despite this abstract dif-
ference, there is no pragmatic distinction between the two theories since 
both in practice decline jurisdiction when the interests of the port state 
are not adversely affected.55 It is this common practice that has solidified 
into the customary rule of international law56 that port states should not 
 
 46. Charteris, supra note 43, at 51. 
 47. Id. 
 48. JESSUP, supra note 37, at 154. 
 49. Id. at 169; see also Chung Chi Cheung v. The King, [1939] A.C. 160, 167 (U.K.) 
(declaring that a port state’s jurisdiction is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by 
itself). 
 50. [1876] 2 Ex. D. 63 (Crown Cases Reserved). 
 51. Id. at 64. 
 52. Id. at 86. 
 53. Id. at 82. 
 54. Charteris, supra note 43, at 45–46. 
 55. CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 36, at 66; JESSUP, supra note 37, at 192. 
 56. Customary international law is derived from the consistent practice of states act-
ing out of a belief that international law requires them to act that way. See MARK W. 
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exercise jurisdiction over the internal affairs of visiting foreign ships 
unless those affairs disturb the peace of the port.57
B. The Internal Affairs Rule in the United States 
The United States is generally regarded as a subscriber to the English 
theory.58 Thus, paralleling the English view, the Supreme Court has held 
that visiting foreign ships subject themselves to American jurisdiction as 
a condition of entry.59 Furthermore, this jurisdictional authority being 
absolute,60 the Court has taken the position that the United States is enti-
tled to unqualifiedly enforce its laws against foreign vessels.61 Neverthe-
less, recognizing that international law compels a more moderate ap-
 
JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 44–48 (4th ed. 2003). Indeed, consis-
tent state practice is the “best evidence” that a rule has become part of customary interna-
tional law. RESTATEMENT § 103 cmt. a. 
 57. It is worth mentioning here that this customary rule was codified in part in the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 
[hereinafter UNCLOS]. Article 27(1) of UNCLOS resolves conflicts with respect to 
criminal jurisdiction on board visiting foreign ships in the following way: 
The criminal jurisdiction of the coastal State should not be exercised on board a 
foreign ship passing through the territorial sea to arrest any person or to con-
duct any investigation in connection with any crime committed on board the 
ship during its passage, save only in the following cases: 
(a) if the consequences of the crime extend to the coastal State; 
(b) if the crime is of a kind to disturb the peace of the country or the good order 
of the territorial sea;  
(c) if the assistance of the local authorities has been requested by the master of 
the ship or by a diplomatic agent or consular officer of the flag State; or 
(d) if such measures are necessary for the suppression of illicit traffic in nar-
cotic drugs or psychotropic substances. 
UNCLOS, art. 27(1).  
 58. See Charteris, supra note 43, at 58; JESSUP, supra note 37, at 191. 
 59. E.g., Patterson v. Bark Eudora, 190 U.S. 169, 179 (1903); United States v. Diek-
elman, 92 U.S. 520, 525 (1875). 
 60. Chief Justice Marshall delivered the most famous pronouncement of the nation’s 
complete and plenary authority over its waters in The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812), where he declared that “[t]he jurisdiction of the na-
tion within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute . . . [and] is susceptible 
of no limitation not imposed by itself.” 
 61. See, e.g., Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100 (1923) (holding that visiting 
foreign vessels are barred from possessing any alcohol in American ports and waters, 
regardless of whether flag state law requires its ships to store such spirits, since the Eight-
eenth Amendment and the National Prohibition Act state a strong public policy against 
such possession). 
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proach to jurisdictional enforcement, the Court has stated that applica-
tions of domestic legislation to conduct occurring on board foreign ships 
should comply with the internal affairs rule.62 This was first explained by 
the Court over a century ago in Wildenhus’s Case.63 There, Chief Justice 
Waite made the following observation: 
From experience, however, it was found long ago that it would be 
beneficial to commerce if the local government would abstain from in-
terfering with the internal discipline of the ship, and the general regula-
tion of the rights and duties of the officers and crew towards the vessel, 
or among themselves. And so by comity it came to be generally under-
stood among civilized nations that all matters of discipline, and all 
things done on board, which affected only the vessel, or those belong-
ing to her, and did not involve the peace and dignity of the country, or 
the tranquility of the port, should be left by the local government to be 
dealt with by the authorities of the nation to which the vessel belonged 
as the laws of that nation, or the interests of its commerce should re-
quire. . . . Such being the general public law on this subject, treaties and 
conventions have been entered into by nations having commercial in-
tercourse, the purpose of which was to settle and define the rights and 
duties of the contracting parties with respect to each other in these par-
ticulars, and thus prevent the inconvenience that might arise from at-
tempts to exercise conflicting jurisdictions.64
An exhaustive list of all ship matters considered “internal” has never 
been compiled. Notwithstanding this, it can be pointed out that the inter-
nal affairs rule’s reasoning has been invoked to relinquish jurisdiction in 
cases involving terms of employment and wages,65 collective bargain-
 
 62. McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 19–21 
(1963); see also Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 585–86 (1953); United States v. Rod-
gers, 150 U.S. 249, 260 (1893). 
 63. Mali v. Keeper of the Common Jail (Wildenhus’s Case), 120 U.S. 1 (1887). 
 64. Id. at 12. 
 65. See Lopes v. S.S. Ocean Daphne, 337 F.2d 777 (4th Cir. 1964); The Albani, 169 
F. 220 (E.D. Pa. 1909); The Becherdass Ambaidass, 3 F. Cas. 13 (D. Mass. 1871) (No. 
1,203); Saunders v. The Victoria, 21 F. Cas. 539 (E.D. Pa. 1854) (No. 12,377); The Pa-
cific, 18 F. Cas. 942 (S.D.N.Y. 1830) (No. 10,644); Thomson v. The Nanny, 23 F. Cas. 
1104 (D.S.C. 1805) (No. 13,984); Willendson v. Forsoket, 29 F. Cas. 1283 (D. Pa. 1801) 
(No. 17,682). Where the complaining seaman has been badly mistreated, however, courts 
have exercised jurisdiction in the interests of justice. See The Salomoni, 29 F. 534 (S.D. 
Ga. 1886); Weiberg v. The St. Oloff, 29 F. Cas. 597 (D. Pa. 1790) (No. 17,357). Jurisdic-
tion has also regularly been exercised where the complaining crewmember is an Ameri-
can citizen. See The Neck, 138 F. 144 (W.D. Wash. 1905); The Alnwick, 132 F. 117 
(S.D.N.Y. 1904); The Falls of Keltie, 114 F. 357 (D. Wash. 1902). 
644 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 32:2 
                                                                                                            
ing,66 personal injury,67 and ship discipline.68 Being of considerable in-
terest to the flag state69 and of little interest to the United States,70 
American courts, through the internal affairs rule, have recognized the 
primacy of flag state law in these matters in order to avoid unnecessary 
conflicts.71 On the other hand, where the interests of the United States 
are significantly affected by internal ship matters, American courts have 
not shied away from exercising jurisdiction.72 Indeed, it is well-settled 
that jurisdiction over foreign vessels and their crew will be asserted when 
their activities offend “the peace or good order of the port either literally 
. . . or in some constructive sense.”73 This “port disturbance” exception 
has been construed broadly, allowing American authorities full discretion 
to determine for themselves what circumstances warrant an invasion of a 
foreign ship’s internal affairs.74 Intervention has been most common in 
cases involving criminal activity75 and customs or immigration viola-
 
 66. See McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10 
(1963); Fruit Dispatch Co. v. National Maritime Union of America, 138 So.2d 853 (La. 
Ct. App. 1962); Compania Maritima Sansoc Limitada, 1950-1951 CCH N.L.R.B. Deci-
sions ¶ 10,081 (1950). 
 67. See The Paula, 91 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1937); The Magdapur, 3 F. Supp. 971 
(S.D.N.Y. 1933); The Falco, 15 F.2d 604 (E.D.N.Y. 1926). Where the injured seaman is 
an American citizen, however, jurisdiction will likely be exercised. See Shorter v. Ber-
muda & West Indies S.S. Co., 57 F.2d 313 (S.D.N.Y. 1932). But see Clark v. Montezuma 
Transp. Co., 216 N.Y.S. 295 (N.Y. App. Div. 1926). 
 68. See Ex parte Anderson, 184 F. 114 (D. Me. 1910). Where ship discipline rises to 
the level of torture, however, jurisdiction will be exercised in the interests of justice. See 
Bolden v. Jensen, 70 F. 505 (D. Wash. 1895). 
 69. See Brainerd Currie, The Silver Oar and All That: A Study of the Romero Case, 27 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 67 (1959) (discussing flag states’ interests in determining compensa-
tion for shipboard torts); Note, The Effect of United States Labor Legislation on the Flag-
of-Convenience Fleet: Regulation of Shipboard Labor Relations and Remedies Against 
Shoreside Picketing, 69 YALE L.J. 498, 514–15 (1959) (discussing flag states’ interests in 
setting shipboard labor policies). 
 70. See RESTATEMENT § 512 cmt. c (observing that “coastal states usually have little 
interest” in the internal affairs of foreign ships). 
 71. Clay J. Garside, Comment, Forcing the American People to Take the Hard NOx: 
The Failure to Regulate Foreign Vessels Under the Clear Air Act as Abuse of Discretion, 
79 TUL. L. REV. 779, 790–91 (2005). 
 72. See CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 36, at 66–67. 
 73. Id. at 66. 
 74. A broad interpretation of what constitutes a “port disturbance” is necessary, be-
cause “[c]ircumstances alter cases and a dispute which at times might have no effect on 
shore, at other times might have serious local consequences.” JESSUP, supra note 37, at 
180. 
 75. For example, criminal convictions were upheld in five cases against Italian sailors 
who, upon learning of the U.S.’s entry into WWII, purposefully destroyed the propulsive 
machinery of their ships in order to scuttle them in their ports. See Polonio v. United 
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tions.76 Additionally, in their efforts to protect the peace of the port, 
American authorities have sometimes imposed obligations on foreign 
vessels which extend beyond their stay. Requiring that all oil tankers 
have double hulls,77 barring any and all possession of liquor during Pro-
hibition,78 and enforcing antitrust laws on foreign shipping companies79 
are three prominent examples. 
Before moving on, it should be noted that the Court’s explanation in 
Wildenhus’s Case that the internal affairs rule was founded on considera-
tions of comity80 has resulted in some confusion. Several commentators 
have understood this to mean that the rule is not a true tenet of interna-
tional law, but rather a courtesy extended by the United States to other 
sovereign nations.81 A closer reading of Chief Justice Waite’s opinion, 
however, reveals that the Court did not leave the internal affairs rule to 
rest on comity alone, nor did it hold that treaties were necessary to con-
firm the rule’s existence. To be sure, the Court stated that the rule arose 
from comity originally and indicated that it might be better protected by 
 
States, 131 F.2d 679 (9th Cir. 1942); Guigni v. United States, 127 F.2d 786 (1st Cir. 
1942); Marchese v. United States, 126 F.2d 671 (5th Cir. 1942); United States v. Scaleg-
geri, 126 F.2d 1023 (3d Cir. 1941); Bersio v. United States, 124 F.2d 310 (4th Cir. 1941). 
Additionally, in Wildenhus’s Case, the Supreme Court upheld the criminal conviction of 
a Belgian seaman who murdered a fellow shipmate on board a Belgian ship in New Jer-
sey, reasoning that the grievousness of the crime disturbed the tranquility of the port. 
Wildenhus’s Case, 120 U.S. at 17–18. Foreign courts, employing the same port distur-
bance reasoning, have similarly upheld criminal convictions for murders committed on 
board alien vessels docked in port. See Chung Chi Cheung, [1937] 29 H.K.L.R. 22; State 
v. Dave Johnson Plazen, 4 Int’l L. Rep. 160 (Costa Rica 1928). But see Case of Antoni, 6 
El Foro 194 (Mex. 1876) (dismissing indictment on the grounds that the murder did not 
disturb the peace of the port), reprinted in MANLEY O. HUDSON, CASES AND OTHER 
MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 630 (1929). 
 76. See Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320 (1909); Buttfield 
v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470 (1904). 
 77. See Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 46 U.S.C. § 3703a (2006). 
 78. See Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100 (1923). In a decision strikingly simi-
lar to Cunard S.S. Co., the Seychelles Supreme Court in R. v. Fayolle, 91 Int’l L. Rep. 
384 (Sey. 1971), upheld the conviction of a foreign ship’s master under the Green Turtle 
Protection Regulations for possessing in port green turtle meat fished outside the territo-
rial waters of Seychelles, reasoning that the Regulations stated an absolute policy against 
green turtle meat possession. 
 79. See United States v. Hamburg-Amerikanische Packet-Fahrtactien-Gesellschaft, 
200 F. 806 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911); United States v. Anchor Line, Ltd., 232 F. Supp. 379 
(S.D.N.Y. 1964). 
 80. Comity can be defined as “a willingness to grant a privilege, not as a matter of 
right, but out of deference and good will.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 267 (6th ed. 1990). 
 81. See, e.g., Maitlin, supra note 30, at 1025. 
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treaties in the interest of preventing misunderstanding.82 Nevertheless, as 
the law stood in the mind of the Court, the internal affairs rule was exis-
tent and established in “the general public law.”83 Furthermore, this un-
derstanding of the internal affairs rule’s status as an international legal 
principle has been affirmed in subsequent Court decisions.84
II. APPLICATION OF THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS RULE 
Like other principles of statutory interpretation, the internal affairs rule 
is a canon of constructive caution.85 The rule, functionally speaking, pre-
sumes that legislation is not intended to regulate the internal affairs of 
visiting foreign ships unless there is a clear statement from Congress to 
the contrary.86 Furthermore, as the following examination of the Su-
preme Court’s Jones Act and National Labor Relations Act jurisprudence 
makes clear, the internal affairs rule does not take an all-or-nothing ap-
proach to the applicability of domestic law. Rather, while the rule may 
work to restrict a particular statute’s reach in one instance, it might not in  
another. 
A. The Jones Act 
The Jones Act allows injured seamen to bring actions for damages 
when their injuries are suffered in the course of employment and are due 
to the negligence of their employer.87 In Uravic v. F. Jarka Co.,88 an 
American stevedore89 was injured on board a German vessel while he 
 
 82. Wildenhus’s Case, 120 U.S. at 12. 
 83. Id. General public law and international law are synonymous. See JANIS, supra 
note 56, at 2.  
 84. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. The U.S. Government appears to have 
adopted this position as well, having relied on this understanding of the internal affairs 
rule to “protest[] the assertion of jurisdiction over controversies [involving American 
vessels], by local magistrates in the territory of a foreign State with which no adequate 
agreements had been concluded.” CHARLES CHENEY HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY 
AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES 739–40 (2d rev. ed. 1945). 
 85. See Garside, supra note 71, at 790–91 (briefly sketching and comparing the inter-
nal affairs rule, the Charming Betsy canon, and the presumption against extraterritorial-
ity). 
 86. See McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 
20–22 (1963). 
 87. 46 U.S.C. app. § 688(a). For a detailed discussion of liability and recovery under 
the Jones Act, see Brian J. Miles, The Standard of Care in a Seaman’s Personal Injury 
Action—Has the Jones Act Been Slighted?, 13 TUL. MAR. L.J. 79 (1988). 
 88. 282 U.S. 234 (1931). 
 89. A stevedore is a laborer who loads and unloads vessels docked in port. THE 
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1701 (4th ed. 2000). Five years prior to Uravic, in 
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was unloading it in New York harbor.90 This injury subsequently led to 
his death.91 Suit was brought under the Act by the stevedore’s adminis-
tratrix92 who asserted the negligence of a fellow-servant as the cause of 
the injury.93 Speaking for a unanimous Court, Justice Holmes reasoned 
that the internal affairs rule was inapplicable under the circumstances 
since the stevedore’s activities went “beyond the scope of discipline and 
private matters that do not interest the territorial power.”94 Indeed, 
Holmes remarked that it would be “extraordinary” to deny American 
legal protections to citizens only “momentarily” engaged on board for-
eign ships.95 The decision of the New York court96 holding the Act inap-
plicable was accordingly reversed.97
A separate set of facts yielded a different result in Romero v. Interna-
tional Terminal Operating Co.98 In Romero, a Spanish seaman brought 
suit against his Spanish employer after he was injured on board a Spanish 
ship docked in Hoboken, New Jersey.99 The seaman was loading a cargo 
of wheat onto the ship when a wire cable suddenly slipped, severing his 
left leg and causing multiple fractures to his right leg.100 Adhering to the 
internal affairs rule, the Court held that providing compensation for the 
injured seaman and regulating the liability of the shipowner were the 
concerns of the state of their common nationality, and that the United 
States had no interest in intruding its own policies into that relation-
 
International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U.S. 50 (1926), the Supreme Court ruled 
that a stevedore was a “seaman” for the purposes of the Jones Act. 
 90. Uravic, 282 U.S. at 238. 
 91. Id. 
 92. An administratrix is a woman appointed by a court to manage the assets and li-
abilities of a deceased person. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 46 (6th ed. 1990). 
 93. Uravic, 282 U.S. at 238. Interestingly, just eleven years earlier, Uravic’s cause of 
action would have failed at the outset since maritime law followed the fellow-servant 
rule, which barred recovery for injuries caused by other crewmembers. See, e.g., The 
Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903). With the passage of the Jones Act in 1920, however, Con-
gress abolished the fellow-servant rule as a defense to shipboard negligence liability. Joel 
K. Goldstein, The Osceola and the Transformation of Maritime Personal Injury Law: 
Some Propositions About the Case and Its Propositions, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 663, 722 
(2003). 
 94. Uravic, 282 U.S. at 240. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Uravic v. F. Jarka Co., 170 N.E. 131 (N.Y. 1929) (decided on authority of Re-
signo v. F. Jarka Co., 162 N.E. 13 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, C.J.)). 
 97. Uravic, 282 U.S. at 241. 
 98. 358 U.S. 354 (1959). 
 99. Id. at 356. 
 100. After the accident, the seaman was taken by ambulance to a hospital in Hoboken 
where he underwent treatment for the next eight months. Currie, supra note 68, at 1 (pull-
ing these facts from the trial record and appellate briefs). 
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ship.101 The fact that the injury occurred in American waters was dis-
missed as a “wholly fortuitous circumstance.”102 Consequently, unlike its 
determination in Uravic, the Court in Romero found that the circum-
stances of the case triggered the internal affairs rule and rendered the 
Jones Act inapplicable.103
B. The National Labor Relations Act 
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) was enacted to guarantee 
the right of workers to organize and to bargain collectively without fear 
of management reprisal.104 To make the NLRA effective, Congress es-
tablished the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), a quasi-judicial 
body empowered to resolve labor disputes.105 Such disputes erupted with 
recurrent regularity in ports throughout the United States during the 
1950s, as labor unions, upset over depressed pay scales and working con-
ditions, picketed foreign vessels and attempted to organize their crews.106
Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A.107 provided the Supreme 
Court with its first opportunity to consider the NLRB’s jurisdiction over 
labor relations aboard visiting foreign ships.108 In Benz, a Liberian vessel 
was docked in Portland, Oregon, when its crew suddenly went on strike 
demanding higher wages and improved working conditions.109 The 
crewmen appointed an American labor union as their collective bargain-
ing representative, and the union and others promptly began picketing 
the vessel.110 After the shipowner brought suit in federal district court 
seeking to enjoin the union’s activities, the union claimed that only the 
NLRB could consider the controversy.111 The Court, however, held that 
the NLRB lacked jurisdiction under the internal affairs rule, remarking 
 
 101. See Romero, 358 U.S. at 384. 
 102. Id. 
 103. See id. 
 104. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (setting forth Congress’s find-
ings and declaration of policy with respect to the Act). 
 105. See id. §§ 153–156. 
 106. See Note, supra note 69, at 503. 
 107. 353 U.S. 138 (1957). 
 108. Suit was brought under the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141–
197 (2006), an amendment to the NLRA. 
 109. Benz, 353 U.S. at 139. 
 110. Id. at 140. 
 111. Id. at 141. Adjudication of certain activities falling within the ambit of the NLRA 
are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB. See Stephen F. Befort, Demystify-
ing Federal Labor and Employment Law Preemption, 13 LAB. LAW. 429, 430–34 (1998). 
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that “Congress did not fashion [the NLRB] to resolve labor disputes be-
tween nationals of other countries operating ships under foreign laws.”112
The rule was similarly employed in McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional 
de Marineros de Honduras113 to find that the NLRB did not have author-
ity under the NLRA to order an election for the unionization of foreign 
seamen recruited in Honduras to serve aboard Honduran vessels. In 
McCulloch, the National Maritime Union114 petitioned the NLRB for 
certification as the bargaining agent for the crewmen.115 The vessels 
were operated by a wholly owned subsidiary of an American corpora-
tion, but their labor relations were governed by several provisions of the 
Honduran Labor Code.116 When the NLRB decided to assert jurisdiction 
and ordered an election to be held among the seamen,117 both the shi-
powners and the Honduran labor union which claimed to represent the 
crewmen filed suit seeking an injunction.118 The Court unanimously up-
held their claims and found the NLRB lacked jurisdiction.119 Rejecting 
the “balancing of contacts” test120 employed by the NLRB, the Court 
reasoned that such a test would invariably “inquire into the internal dis-
cipline and order” of the ships in contravention of “the well-established 
rule of international law that the law of the flag state ordinarily governs 
the internal affairs of a ship.”121
Distinguishing the factual elements that triggered the internal affairs 
rule in Benz and McCulloch, the Court upheld the applicability of the 
NLRA in International Longshoremen’s Local 1416 v. Ariadne Shipping 
 
 112. Benz, 353 U.S. at 143. 
 113. 372 U.S. 10 (1963). 
 114. Founded in 1937, the National Maritime Union (NMU) organized seamen and 
waterfront workers, and was one of the most radical labor unions in the United States. 
The NMU lent support to various anti-colonial and international revolutionary struggles, 
and called for racial integration of the East Coast shipping industry. Ahmed A. White, 
Mutiny, Shipboard Strikes, and the Supreme Court’s Subversion of New Deal Labor Law, 
25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB L. 275, 311–17 (2004). 
 115. McCulloch, 372 U.S. at 13. 
 116. Id. at 14. Under these Honduran labor laws, only certain specified Honduran un-
ions were permitted to act as bargaining representatives for seamen serving on board 
Honduran vessels. Id. 
 117. See United Fruit Co., 134 N.L.R.B. 287 (1961). 
 118. McCulloch, 372 U.S. at 12. 
 119. Id. at 21. 
 120. The balancing of contacts test employed by the NLRB consisted of weighing 
several factors, such as the nationality of the parties, the place of the dispute, and the 
beneficial ownership of the shipping corporation, to determine whether jurisdiction was 
appropriately asserted. See United Fruit Co., 134 N.L.R.B. at 288–90. 
 121. McCulloch, 372 U.S. at 21. 
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Co.122 In Ariadne, American unions picketed several foreign ships 
docked in Florida to protest substandard wages paid to American long-
shoremen.123 The owners of the vessels attempted to enjoin the picketing 
in state court, but a unanimous Supreme Court held that the NLRA pre-
empted the field and that the NLRB thus had exclusive jurisdiction to 
consider the matter.124 Noting that Benz and McCulloch each involved 
situations where NLRA regulation “would necessitate inquiry into the 
‘internal discipline and order’ of a foreign vessel,”125 the Court remarked 
that the longshoremen’s “casual” involvement with the foreign ships in 
no way implicated their internal affairs.126
III. SPECTOR V. NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE LTD. 
Spector was the first case in twenty years that presented the Court with 
a domestic statute arguably implicating the internal affairs of a visiting 
foreign ship.127 The Court resolved little in the case, however, as the Jus-
tices varied greatly in their readings of the aforementioned Jones Act and 
National Labor Relations Act cases. 
A. Background 
The plaintiffs in Spector were disabled individuals who purchased 
round-trip tickets for cruises aboard two Bahamian-flagged Norwegian 
Cruise Line (NCL)128 ships.129 The cruises departed from Houston, 
Texas and sailed to foreign ports of call.130 During their vacations, the 
plaintiffs discovered that many of the ships facilities—public restrooms, 
swimming pools, restaurants, elevators, preferred cabins—were inacces-
sible to them.131 Furthermore, the plaintiffs discovered that NCL main-
 
 122. 397 U.S. 195 (1970). 
 123. Id. at 196–97. 
 124. Id. at 200. 
 125. Id. at 198 (quoting McCulloch, 372 U.S. at 19). 
 126. Id. at 199–200. 
 127. Similar to Benz and McCulloch, the Court in Windward Shipping (London) Ltd. v. 
American Radio Ass’n, 415 U.S. 104 (1974), held that picketing of two foreign-flagged 
vessels by American unions to protest substandard wages paid to foreign seamen was an 
activity affecting the ships’ internal operations, and thus was not covered by the Labor 
Management Relations Act. 
 128. NCL is a Bermudian corporation offering cruise vacations departing from and 
returning to United States ports. NCL Corporation Ltd., Annual Report (Form 20-F), at 
14 (Mar. 28, 2006). 
 129. Spector, 545 U.S. at 126. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Brief for the Petitioners at 17–24, Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 545 
U.S. 119 (2005) (No. 03-1388), 2004 WL 2803188. 
2007] VISITING FOREIGN SHIPS 651 
                                                                                                            
tained several policies which were applicable to them but not to other 
passengers. For instance, NCL charged higher fares and special sur-
charges on account of the plaintiffs’ disabilities and required them to re-
main subject to removal from the ship should their presence endanger the 
“comfort” of the other passengers.132
Upset over their treatment, the plaintiffs filed suit claiming NCL dis-
criminated against them in violation of Title III of the ADA.133 Title III 
prohibits discrimination based on disability in places of “public accom-
modation”134 and in “specified public transportation services.”135 To that 
end, Title III requires covered entities to make “reasonable modifications 
in policies, practices, or procedures” to accommodate disabled per-
sons,136 and to remove physical barriers where “readily achievable.”137
While allowing many of the claims to go forward, the district court 
dismissed those pertaining to barrier removal on the grounds that the 
governing ADA compliance regulations did not specifically cover cruise 
ships.138 The Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, declaring 
that the clear statement rule precluded any application of federal law to 
visiting foreign ships without specific evidence of congressional in-
tent.139 Finding nothing in either the ADA’s text or legislative history to 
indicate that Congress had thought about Title III’s application to foreign 
cruise ships, the Fifth Circuit held that Title III was wholly inapplica-
ble.140
B. The Supreme Court’s Opinions 
1. The Holding of the Court 
The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit’s judgment, criticizing it 
as being “inconsistent with the Court’s case law and with sound princi-
 
 132. Id. at 20. 
 133. Spector, 545 U.S. at 126. 
 134. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 
 135. Id. § 12184(a). 
 136. Id. §§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii), 12184(b)(2)(A). 
 137. Id. §§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv), 12184(b)(2)(C). 
 138. Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 2002 WL 34100212 (S.D. Tex. 2002). On 
November 26, 2004, the responsible agencies did finally issue draft guidelines for cruise 
ships as well as a notice of proposed rulemaking. See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of 
Disability: Passenger Vessels, 69 Fed. Reg. 69,246 (Nov. 26, 2004) (to be codified at 49 
C.F.R. pt. 37); Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) Accessibility Guidelines for Pas-
senger Vessels, 69 Fed. Reg. 69,244 (Nov. 26, 2004) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 
1195). 
 139. Spector, 356 F.3d at 646. 
 140. Id. at 650. 
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ples of statutory interpretation.”141 In particular, the five-Justice majori-
ty142 held that the Fifth Circuit’s articulation of the clear statement rule 
was too expansive, and that the rule could not be understood as blanketly 
applying to foreign ships in their entirety.143 The majority found that 
cruise ships fall within Title III’s definitions of “public accommodation” 
and “specified public transportation services.”144 Thus, said the majority, 
the ADA’s basic requirements on accommodation of disabled persons 
presumptively apply to all cruise ships operating in American waters, 
whether foreign or domestic.145 The majority then noted that any struc-
tural modifications which would bring a ship into non-compliance with 
its international obligations146 would not be “readily achievable” and 
therefore not be required by Title III.147
Thus, while acknowledging that some of the plaintiffs’ claims were po-
tentially barred, the majority rejected the Fifth Circuit’s determination 
that the ADA was altogether inapplicable to foreign cruise ships. More 
importantly for purposes of this discussion, the majority unambiguously 
held that the Fifth Circuit misinterpreted the clear statement rule. The 
majority could not agree, however, on how exactly the rule worked. Al-
ready divided on the issue of whether the clear statement rule disquali-
fied any application of the ADA to foreign cruise ships,148 the Court di-
verged further as the majority splintered on the question of what limita-
tions the rule imposed. 
 
 141. Spector, 545 U.S. at 130. 
 142. Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Kennedy, Souter, and Stevens constituted the majority. 
 143. Spector, 545 U.S at 130. 
 144. Id. at 129. 
 145. Id. at 132–33. 
 146. There is an open question here as to what exactly the majority would exclude 
under Title III’s “readily achievable” standard, since “international legal obligation” was 
not well defined. See id. at 135. A simple solution might be to say that an international 
legal obligation is the same as an obligation of international law. If indeed these terms are 
equivalent, then rules of customary international law, and therefore the internal affairs 
rule, would be included in the definition. See, e.g., JANIS, supra note 56, at 41–55 (ex-
plaining that international custom is a source of international law). It is unlikely that this 
is what the majority intended, however, since those parts of Justice Kennedy’s opinion 
dealing with the internal affairs rule did not command a majority vote. The majority 
probably intended international legal obligations to mean “treaty obligations,” since they 
cite as an example the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, Nov. 1, 
1974, 32 U.S.T. 47, 164 U.N.T.S. 113. See Spector, 545 U.S. at 135. 
 147. Id. at 135–36. 
 148. The dissenting Justices—O’Connor, Rehnquist, and Scalia—answered this ques-
tion in the affirmative. For a discussion of their view, see infra Part III.B.4. 
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2. The Plurality Opinion 
Three of the Justices from the majority—Kennedy, Souter, and  
Stevens—equated the clear statement rule with the internal affairs rule. 
Calling it “the internal affairs clear statement rule,” the plurality declared 
that the rule, absent a clear expression of congressional intent to do oth-
erwise, would simply preclude those applications of the ADA which af-
fect the internal affairs of visiting foreign ships.149 For instance, they rea-
soned that NCL’s policies of charging disabled persons higher fares and 
reserving the right to remove them “have nothing to do with [the] ship’s 
internal affairs,” so the rule would not prevent Title III from applying to 
those discriminatory policies in full force.150 On the other hand, the ac-
cessibility claims seeking removal of coamings151 and other structural 
barriers “likely would interfere with the internal affairs of foreign ships,” 
thus requiring a clear statement from Congress to achieve that end.152 
Additionally, the plurality stated that the clear statement rule did not 
mandate an all-or-nothing approach to the applicability of a particular 
statute. Rather, the rule exempts from the reach of domestic legislation 
only those applications which implicate “the internal order and discipline 
of the vessel, rather than the peace of the port.”153
3. The Concurring Opinion 
The remaining two Justices from the majority—Breyer and Gins-
burg—did not ascribe any further significance to the clear statement rule. 
They stated that the rule’s sole purpose lays in avoiding conflicts with 
international obligations, and since the majority’s interpretation of the 
ADA’s “readily achievable” standard fulfilled that purpose, nothing 
more was required.154 In their view, the extent to which Title III impli-
cated the internal affairs of foreign ships was completely irrelevant.155 
The concurring Justices concluded that domestic law should apply to 
visiting foreign vessels, even when it affects the ship’s internal affairs, so 
 
 149. Spector, 545 U.S. at 138. Justice Kennedy stated that “[t]he relevant category for 
which the Court demands a clear congressional statement . . . consists not of all applica-
tions of a statute to foreign-flag vessels but only those applications that would interfere 
with the foreign vessel’s internal affairs.” Id. at 132. 
 150. Id. at 133. 
 151. Coamings are the raised edges around a ship’s doors and other openings designed 
keep water out. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 353 (4th ed. 2000). 
 152. Spector, 545 U.S. at 135. 
 153. Id. at 130. It should be noted here that Justice Thomas agreed with this assessment 
of the rule’s operation and joined in this part of the plurality’s opinion. 
 154. Id. at 144 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 155. Id. at 145. 
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long as “there is good reason to apply our own law” and no potential for 
“international discord” exists.156
4. The Dissenting Opinion 
The dissenting Justices, like the plurality, thought that the clear state-
ment rule incorporated the internal affairs rule when the application of 
American law to visiting foreign ships was at issue.157 Indeed, they un-
derstood the internal affairs rule to be an established rule of international 
law.158 Despite this shared belief, the dissent disagreed with the plurality 
and majority on two points. First, the dissent stated that any application 
of domestic legislation implicating the internal affairs of a ship would 
trigger the clear statement rule, thus preventing that application.159 Con-
sequently, the dissent declined to accept the majority’s invitation to con-
strue Title III’s “readily achievable” standard to avoid conflicts with in-
ternational obligations.160 As they saw things, the clear statement rule 
achieved that result on its own.161 Second, parting ways with the plural-
ity, the dissenting Justices thought that the ADA and other statutes could 
not be selectively applied under the rule.162 In their view, since some ap-
plications of Title III would affect the internal affairs of foreign cruise 
ships, the absence of a clear congressional statement rendered the entire 
statute inapplicable.163
IV. ANALYSIS 
Spector’s holding with respect to the clear statement rule is rather lim-
ited. The Court clearly rejected the position taken by the Fifth Circuit 
that the rule applies to visiting foreign ships in toto. However, this is as 
far as the majority went. Left unresolved were questions regarding both 
the scope of the rule and its operation. First, an open issue remains as to 
whether the clear statement rule tracks the internal affairs rule, or 
 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 149 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The plurality correctly recognizes that Con-
gress must clearly express its intent to apply its laws to foreign-flag ships when those 
laws interfere with the ship’s internal order.”). 
 158. Id. at 150. 
 159. Id. at 155. 
 160. Id. at 153–54. 
 161. Id. at 154. 
 162. Id. at 156. 
 163. Id. at 157 (“Since some applications of Title III plainly affect the internal order of 
foreign-flag ships, the absence of a clear statement renders the statute inapplicable—even 
though some applications of the statute, if severed from the rest, would not require a clear 
statement.”). 
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whether it instead seeks only to avoid international conflicts. Second, 
assuming that the clear statement rule’s scope is defined by the internal 
affairs rule, the issue of whether the rule operates on a provision-by-
provision or an all-or-nothing basis remains undecided. Both of these 
questions will be considered in turn, and it will be argued that the plural-
ity’s position provides the proper standards. 
A. The Scope of the Rule: Confirming the Internal Affairs Rule 
Though not reflected in the Court’s holding, a majority of the Justices 
in Spector confirmed the vitality of the internal affairs rule. Seven Jus-
tices held the view that the clear statement rule requires specific congres-
sional intent before domestic statutes will be construed to interfere with 
the internal affairs of visiting foreign ships.164 This interpretation of the 
clear statement rule’s scope is correct since it confers on flag states the 
deference over regulation of their ships’ internal matters long afforded 
them by both the United States and the international community.165
1. Correcting the Concurrence 
The idea of the “internal affairs clear statement rule” was not unani-
mously accepted, however, as the two concurring Justices declared that 
the clear statement rule’s scope went no further than avoiding conflicts 
with international legal obligations.166 Supporting their conclusion, the 
concurring Justices stated that Benz and McCulloch simply held that 
congressional statutes should not be construed so as to violate interna-
tional obligations when other interpretations remain available.167 Read-
ing the internal affairs rule into the clear statement rule, for them, then, 
was an over-inclusive means of avoiding such conflicts since doing so 
would preclude applying domestic legislation in cases where no conflict 
exists. 
This position is problematic for several reasons. First, the concurring 
Justices’ conclusion rests on an incomplete interpretation of Benz and 
McCulloch. Those cases did indeed hold the NLRA inapplicable to the 
foreign ships in question for fear of provoking international discord,168 
 
 164. Justices Kennedy, O’Connor, Scalia, Souter, Stevens, Thomas, and Chief Justice 
Rehnquist all held this view. See supra Parts III.B.2 and III.B.4. 
 165. See supra Part I. 
 166. See supra Part III.B.3; see also supra note 146 (discussing the ambiguity of the 
term “international legal obligation”). 
 167. Spector, 545 U.S. at 143–44 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 168. The Court in Benz stated that it would not hold the NLRA applicable to the for-
eign ship’s labor relations without a clear congressional statement, since to do otherwise 
would “run interference in such a delicate field of international relations.” Benz, 353 U.S 
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but hardly by paying lip service to the vessels’ internal affairs. Rather, 
Benz and McCulloch identified the NLRA’s intrusive effect on the ships’ 
internal labor affairs as being the root cause of the conflict,169 which is 
why McCulloch cited as authority the “rule of international law that the 
law of the flag state ordinarily governs the internal affairs of a ship.”170 
Second, in arriving at their conception of the clear statement rule, the 
concurring Justices appear to conflate two related canons of statutory 
construction, the internal affairs rule and the Charming Betsy canon. De-
rived from Chief Justice Marshall’s statement in Murray v. Schooner 
Charming Betsy171 that “an act of Congress ought never to be construed 
to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction re-
mains,”172 the Charming Betsy canon’s principal aim is to harmonize 
domestic law with international law.173 The majority’s interpretation of 
Title III’s “readily achievable” standard to avoid conflicts with interna-
tional legal obligations is a good example of the Charming Betsy canon 
at work.174 However, while the plurality thought more was needed from 
the clear statement rule since foreign ships were involved, the concurring 
Justices did not. The plurality was right. Relying solely on the Charming 
Betsy canon under these circumstances is impractical given that port 
state law and flag state law are not always amenable to harmonization.175 
When the two laws conflict, courts must sometimes abandon harmoniza-
tion efforts and focus instead on determining which law will prevail. 
Here is where the internal affairs rule shows its worth, since its raison 
d’être is to answer that question. 
As an aside, it is possible that the “errors” just discussed were an at-
tempt by the concurring Justices to strip the internal affairs of visiting 
foreign ships of the partial immunity to which they are currently enti-
 
at 147. Similarly, in McCulloch, the Court remarked that ruling in favor of NLRA regula-
tion “would raise considerable disturbance . . . in our international relations.” McCulloch, 
372 U.S. at 19. 
 169. See supra Part II.B. 
 170. McCulloch, 372 U.S. at 21. 
 171. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804). 
 172. Id. at 118. 
 173. Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of Powers: Re-
thinking the Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 GEO. L.J. 479, 484 (1998). 
 174. See supra note 147 and accompanying text. 
 175. Such is the case whenever port state law and flag state law truly conflict, a fre-
quent occurrence in foreign vessel actions. Indeed, in many of the Supreme Court’s cases 
involving the application of domestic law to visiting foreign ships, the governments of 
the vessels involved have filed briefs alerting the Court to the existence of a conflict of 
laws. See Symeon Symeonides, Maritime Conflicts of Law from the Perspective of Mod-
ern Choice of Law Methodology, 7 MAR. LAW. 223, 224–25 (1982). 
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tled.176 While this “solves” the problems just mentioned, such an ap-
proach creates new problems of its own. First, pragmatically speaking, 
its excessive self-interestedness is counterproductive. To be sure, no one 
expects port states to sacrifice their own policies out of sheer altruistic 
concern for those of flag states, and international law is clear that flag 
state jurisdiction yields to port state jurisdiction.177 However, it is unjust 
and unfair for vessels to expect that their conditions might vary with each 
port at which they call. Moreover, this move towards territorial exclusiv-
ity will not only wreck havoc on the international shipping industry,178 
but will also “invite retaliatory action from other nations.”179 Second, 
from an international law perspective, this shift is illegal. Unless strip-
ping foreign ships of their partial internal affairs immunity is attained by 
treaty or other agreement, one state’s unilateral disregard for that immu-
nity is contrary to international law.180 That this act might signal the be-
ginning of a new general practice among nations, thus eventually altering 
customary international law, will not save that act from the stigma of 
illegality.181 If such a shift in international law is indeed desired, then 
concerted action by formal agreement should be pursued rather than uni-
lateral action in defiance of existing law.182
 
 176. That this may have been the concurring Justices’ ulterior motive is signaled by the 
advocacy of some commentators that the United States take such an approach. See, e.g., 
R. Tali Epstein, Comment, Should the Fair Labor Standards Act Enjoy Extraterritorial 
Application?: A Look at the Unique Case of Flags of Convenience, 13 U. PA. J. INT’L 
BUS. L. 653 (1993) (arguing that stripping foreign ships of their partial internal affairs 
immunity will benefit the American labor force). 
 177. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
 178. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
 179. McCulloch, 372 U.S. at 21. 
 180. See JANIS, supra note 56, at 41–44 (describing the binding nature of customary 
international law). 
 181. See Jörg Kammerhofer, Uncertainty in the Formal Sources of International Law: 
Customary International Law and Some of Its Problems, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 523, 531–32 
(2004). 
 182. That the United States once held this opinion and acted upon it is revealed by 
instructions sent from Washington to the American Minister in Madrid on October 28, 
1852, during discussions arising out of the treatment accorded to an American vessel, The 
Crescent City, by the officials of Spain in Cuba. In those instructions it was said: 
You will state that this government does not question the right of every nation 
to prescribe the conditions on which vessels of other nations may be admitted 
into her ports. That, nevertheless, those conditions ought not to conflict with 
the received usages which regulate the commercial intercourse among civilized 
nations. That those usages are well known and long established and no nation 
can disregard them without giving just cause of complaint to all other nations 
whose interests would be affected by their violation. 
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2. The Internal Affairs Rule and Modern Conflict of Laws Methodology 
Another argument in favor of the clear statement rule incorporating the 
internal affairs rule is that the internal affairs rule is consistent with mod-
ern conflict of laws183 theory, “interest analysis”184 in particular. When 
port states seek to apply their laws to visiting foreign ships, true conflicts 
routinely arise. Such is the case whenever port state law and flag state 
law differ and the policies underlying each have a genuine claim to ap-
plication.185 In this situation, interest analysis holds that port state courts 
should normally apply port state law.186 Because of the concurrent flag 
state interests, however, interest analysis also asserts that port state courts 
may take “a more moderate and restrained interpretation” of port state 
law.187 This means that port state courts may recognize the applicability 
of port state law, but, in deference to the contrary interest of the flag 
state, will decline to assert for the port state an interest in having its law 
applied.188
This is all that the internal affairs rule requires. The rule presumes that 
port states do not intend to interfere with matters that are primarily of 
concern only to the ship and its flag state. If, however, those matters af-
fect the peace of the port, then that presumption is effectively rebutted. 
Thus, the internal affairs rule does not seek to simply subserviate port 
state law to flag state law, but rather to mitigate the tension when the two 
conflict. This sensitivity to the substantive aspects of the two laws dem-
onstrates the internal affairs rule’s compatibility with prevailing conflict 
of laws theory. 
 
H.R. EXEC. DOC. NO. 86, 33d Cong., 1st Sess., at 24 (1853). 
 183. Conflict of laws is that branch of jurisprudence which deals with disputes subject 
to the conflicting laws of two or more states. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 299–300 (6th 
ed. 1990). 
 184. Developed by Professor Brainerd Currie, interest analysis seeks “to ensure that 
the law which is applied in the majority of cases will be the one whose application in a 
particular context will serve the purposes for which that law was created.” Gregory E. 
Smith, Choice of Law in the United States, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 1041, 1047 (1987). 
 185. See id. 
 186. See Brainerd Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 
1959 DUKE L.J. 171, 178. 
 187. See Brainerd Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
754, 757 (1963). 
 188. A judicial operation of this sort was famously performed in Bernkrant v. Fowler, 
360 P.2d 906 (Cal. 1961), where Justice Roger Traynor, after observing that California 
would be constitutionally justified in applying its Statute of Frauds to deny a claim 
against the estate of a local domiciliary, chose not to attribute to the California legislature 
an intent to preclude enforcement of an oral agreement executed in Nevada for the benefit 
of Nevada domiciliaries when Nevada had no similar statute in accordance with its policy 
of vindicating the reasonable expectations of its people. 
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B. The Rule’s Operation: A Provision-by-Provision Argument 
The debate within the Supreme Court over whether the clear statement 
rule applies on a provision-by-provision or all-or-nothing basis proved 
more contentious than that over the rule’s scope, as the Justices closely 
split four to three favoring the former approach over the latter.189 The 
plurality reasoned that since the NLRA was held applicable in Ariadne 
but not in Benz and McCulloch,190 the same provision-by-provision ap-
proach should be taken with respect to the ADA.191 Specifically, the plu-
rality thought that the clear statement rule would restrain only those Title 
III provisions which touched upon the vessel’s internal affairs, leaving 
all the remaining provisions effective.192
The dissenting Justices believed that the plurality’s approach encom-
passed an “utterly implausible” view of congressional intent.193 They 
stated that Congress could not have had separate intent with respect to 
each provision of Title III, and that Congress either did or did not have 
foreign ships in mind when it enacted the statute.194 Consequently, since 
Title III did not contain a clear statement as to its applicability to foreign 
vessels, the fact that some of its provisions implicated their internal af-
fairs necessarily rendered the entire statute inapplicable.195 The dissent, 
therefore, took the plurality to task for attempting to force foreign ships 
into compliance with Title III requirements that were never intended to 
apply to them.196
While the dissenting Justices’ argument is persuasive at a glance, 
closer inspection reveals that it rests on an inconsistency in reasoning. 
The dissent, like the plurality, threw its support behind the internal af-
fairs rule, a rule that presumes Congress does intend its laws to regulate 
the non-internal affairs of foreign vessels. Thus admitting Congress’s 
intent to regulate the non-internal affairs of foreign vessels, the dissent 
cannot fairly argue that a provision-by-provision approach, whereby non-
internal matters are automatically subject to regulation while internal 
matters require a clear statement, somehow fails to regard that intent. 
 
 189. See supra Parts III.B.2 and III.B.4. As an aside, the two concurring Justices, 
though not in favor of the internal affairs rule conception of the clear statement rule, 
noted that they agreed with the plurality’s provision-by-provision approach to the rule. 
Spector, 545 U.S. at 143 n.1 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 190. See supra Part II.B. 
 191. Spector, 545 U.S. at 138. 
 192. Id. at 138–39. 
 193. Id. at 156 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. at 157. 
 196. Id. at 156. 
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Rather than “delusional,”197 it is entirely rational to believe that Congress 
intends some provisions of its statutes to apply to visiting foreign ships 
while intending exemptions with regards to others.198 Moreover, the plu-
rality’s adoption of the provision-by-provision approach adheres not only 
to previous Court practice with respect to this clear statement rule,199 but 
with other clear statement rules as well.200
V. CONCLUSION 
The clear statement rule is the canon of statutory construction em-
ployed by American courts to determine the applicability of U.S. law to 
visiting foreign ships. Due to the ever-increasing number of foreign ves-
sels calling on American ports, there is a great need for a more definite 
and authoritative restatement of that rule. Indeed, while considering the 
applicability of the ADA to foreign cruise ships, the Court in Spector 
was well aware that its decision would have important implications for 
the applicability of other statutes as well.201 It is therefore unfortunate 
that the Justices could not come to an agreement on the rule’s scope or 
operation. 
While the uncertainty over the proper standards to apply to the clear 
statement rule may not have been fully resolved in Spector, the case nev-
ertheless provides an answer. By assimilating the internal affairs rule and 
the provision-by-provision approach into its articulation of the clear 
statement rule, the plurality adhered to the traditional American view-
point and exercised due regard for international law. There is reason, 
 
 197. Id. 
 198. The dissenting Justices are likely correct that Congress did not “in fact” have 
individualized intent with respect to each provision of Title III. See id. However, it defies 
reality to expect Congress to have foreseen and considered every contingency arising 
under the statute. Given this situation, the determination that courts need to make is 
“what Congress would have wished if these problems had occurred to it.” Bersch v. 
Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 993 (2d Cir. 1975) (Friendly, J.). 
 199. See supra Part II. 
 200. For example, the Court took the same provision-by-provision approach when it 
applied the “presumption against extraterritoriality” to a couple of cases involving the 
Seamen’s Act of 1915. Compare Strathearn S.S. Co. v. Dillon, 252 U.S. 348 (1920) 
(holding that Section 4 of the Act does apply extraterritorially to invalidate wage ad-
vancements), with Sandberg v. McDonald, 248 U.S. 185 (1918) (holding that Section 11 
of the Act does not apply extraterritorially to invalidate wage advancements). 
 201. In rejecting the Fifth Circuit’s articulation of the clear statement rule, the plurality 
noted the adverse consequences that such a broad reading of the rule would have for Title 
II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended 
in scattered section of 42 U.S.C.). See Spector, 545 U.S. at 132. 
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